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Abstract
We show that the standard concertina result for tariff reforms – i.e. lowering
the highest tariff increases welfare – no longer holds in general if we allow for
international capital mobility. The result can break down if the good whose
tariff is lowered is not capital intensive. If the concertina reform lowers welfare
it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising a second goal that is
typically connected with trade liberalisation.
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1 Introduction
On most people’s lists of results from the trade theory literature with a direct impact on
the policy-making community, the concertina theorem would occupy a prominent position.
This is probably due to both its simplicity and intuitive appeal: Under the assumption
of substitutability between the goods, lowering the highest among a number of tariffs in
an otherwise distortion-free small open economy with many goods and factors increases
welfare, as does the increase in the lowest tariff. The concertina rule is widely used in
practice, e.g. it underlies the well establishedWorld Bank recommendation that developing
countries reduce the dispersion of tariffs when liberalising trade. One aim of this paper
is to explore the robustness of the concertina rule to the presence of international factor
mobility. This seems an obvious undertaking given the prevalence of cross-border flows of
factors of production (to which in the following we will collectively refer as capital). Yet,
surprisingly, the question seems not to have been studied before.1
To be sure, a (small) subset of contributions to the literature on trade policy reform
does look at the question of international capital mobility, but with a different focus.
Neary and Ruane (1988) show that unrestricted international capital mobility increases
the cost of tariff protection because ceteris paribus the import reductions induced by a
given tariff vector are bigger if capital is internationally mobile. The analysis by Neary
1Abe (1992) analyes the concertina result in the presence of public goods, Lopez and Panagariya (1992)
look at the case of imported intermediate inputs, Diewert et al. (1991) allow for the presence of multiple
households, nontraded goods and domestic distortions, while Beghin and Karp (1992) look at the concertina
result in the presence of producer specific subsidies.
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and Ruane implies that a second standard result from the literature on tariff reforms –
namely that proportional reductions of all tariffs are welfare increasing – does still hold
when capital is internationally mobile. Neary (1993) extends the analysis to the case where
international capital flows are subject to taxes and shows that a proportional reduction of
taxes to goods and factor trade is welfare increasing. In addition, Neary analyses separate
reforms of tariffs and investment taxes but does not look at the question of interest in this
paper, i.e. changes in the tariff structure. As one main result of our paper, we show that
the concertina reform may indeed lower welfare in the presence of international capital
mobility. It turns out that this possiblity exists if the good with the highest tariff is not
capital intensive.
We furthermore explore the role that international capital mobility has in determining
the market access effects of the single-tariff reforms we consider, i.e. their effect on the
value of imports. In doing so we relate to the recent literature on trade liberalisation and
market access, most notably Ju and Krishna (2000) and Anderson and Neary (2006), who
look at this question for a small open economy without factor mobility. Ju and Krishna
(2000) have shown that – perhaps surprisingly – there is a potential conflict between the
welfare and market access objectives of trade liberalisation, i.e. not every reduction in
tariffs that increases welfare does increase the overall import value. Ju and Krishna show
however that under standard assumptions it is impossible for import value and welfare
to fall at the same time as a consequence of trade liberalisation. We show that this “no-
double-loss” (NDL) proposition can be overturned as well if international capital mobility
is allowed. In the case of the concertina reform, this is again possible if the good with
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the highest tariff is not capital intensive. In addition we show that any concertina reform
that lowers welfare will lower market access as well, while the reverse is not true. We are
thus able to point out a close link between one of the core welfare results from the trade
reform literature and an early core result in the still developing market access literature.
Intuitively, international capital mobility changes the results of the standard model
because in its presence trade in goods is no longer balanced in general as there are now
cross-border payments to capital owners. If trade liberalisation leads to capital inflows,
domestic imports will increase by less than domestic exports. Capital inflows in turn
occur in the course of a concertina reform if the good with the highest tariff is not capital
intensive. In section 2 we develop the basic framework and derive the two main results
with regard to the welfare effect (section 2.1) and market access effect (section 2.2) of
tariff reforms. Section 3 links the two results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The analysis is conducted in the framework of a competitive small open economy producing
n+ 1 final goods using internationally mobile capital k as well a vector of internationally
immobile factors of production v. Supply can be described by the restricted profit function
pi(p, r) ≡ max
y0,y,k
{
y0 + p′y − rk| (y0, y, k) feasible
}
(1)
where p are the domestic prices of non-numeraire goods and y their supplies, y0 is the
supply of the numeraire good (with p0 ≡ 1), r gives the domestic and foreign return to
internationally mobile capital and k its domestic employment.2 The vector of internation-
2All vectors are column vectors, and their transposes are denoted by a prime.
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ally immobile factors is held constant throughout the analysis and therefore suppressed as
an argument pi(·), as is the price of the numeraire good. The tariff on the numeraire good
is zero, and it can in fact be interpreted as a composite of potentially many export goods.
Import goods with zero tariffs, on the other hand, are part of the vector of non-numeraire
goods.3 The properties of pi(·) are standard. Notably, it is homogenous of degree one in
the price vector (p0, p, r). GNP is given by the mobile-capital GNP function
p˜i(p, r) = pi(p, r) + rk¯, (2)
where k¯ denotes the economy’s endowment of mobile factors that is held constant through-
out and hence suppressed as an argument of p˜i(·).
Demand is summarized in the expenditure function
e(p, u) ≡ min
x0,x
{
x0 + p′x | f(x0, x) ≥ u
}
(3)
with (x0, x) as the vector of compensated demand functions and f(·) as the direct utility
function. We can now define the mobile capital trade expenditure function
E(p, r, u) ≡ e(p, u)− p˜i(p, r), (4)
and we have
Ep(·) = ep(·)− p˜ip(·) = m and Er(·) = −p˜i(·) = k − k¯ = k˜, (5)
where m is the vector of (gross and net) imports of the non-numeraire goods, and k˜ are
3The distinction between untaxed imports and exports is not not important for the welfare analysis but
matters for the analysis of market access.
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net capital imports. This allows us to write the economy’s budget constraint as
E(p, r, u) = t′m, (6)
where t is the vector of per unit tariffs. Differentiation for a constant value of r yields,
after substituting for m, and using the small country assumption, the central equation
describing the welfare change:
µ−1du = t′Eppdt (7)
where µ ≡ (Eu − t′Epu)−1 is the shadow price of foreign exchange which is assumed
positive, by standard reasoning.4
2.1 Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalisation
Rewriting the welfare equation for the case where only the tariff on good k is altered gives
µ−1du =
∑
i6=0
tiEijdtj (8)
where Eij is short for Epipj . We now rewrite this equation in terms of ad valorem tariffs,
where for convenience we use ad valorem tariffs τ defined as a proportion of the domestic
price, hence τi ≡ ti/pi. We then get
µ−1du =
τj + (pjEjj)−1 ∑
i6=0,j
tiEij
 pjEjjdtj
=
τj + ∑
i6=0,j
piEij
pjEjj
τi
 pjEjjdtj
=
τj − ∑
i6=0,j
ωijτi
 pjEjjdtj (9)
4See Neary (1995, 539-40) for a collection of arguments justifying this assumption.
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where
ωij ≡ − piEij
pjEjj
, ωrj ≡ − rErj
pjEjj
,
∑
i6=0,j
ωij = 1− ω0j − ωrj ,
using the linear homogeneity of the mobile capital trade expenditure function in (p0, p, r).
Lowering the tariff on good j increases welfare if and only if the term in brackets is positive.
The constrained optimal tariff on good j for given values of the other tariffs is given by
τ oj =
∑
i6=0,j
ωijτi. (10)
It is instructive to compare (9) with the analogous formula in the model without interna-
tional factor mobility, as given in equation (8) of Neary (1998). The formula in this case
is identical to (9) but for the fact that ωrj is excluded. In order to see what difference this
makes, it is helpful to rewrite (9) as
µ−1du =
∑
i6=0,j
ωij(τj − τi) + (ω0j + ωrj)τj
 pjEjjdtj . (11)
Consider the case where τj is the largest ad valorem tariff. Under the usual assumption
that all goods are net substitutes for good j in import demand (and hence all ωij are
positive), the first summation term is strictly positive. Note that ωrj is positive if and
only if good j is capital intensive in a general equilibrium sense, i.e. if a decrease in pj
decreases the economy-wide employment of internationally mobile capital. Hence, the
concertina result “from above” (lowering the highest tariff increases welfare) holds if good
j is capital intensive. It does not necessarily hold if good j is not capital intensive. It is
easily seen from (11) that a necessary condition for the concertina result to break down is
ω0j + ωrj < 0.
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What leads to the breakdown of the concertina result from above if good j, the good
with the highest tariff, is not capital intensive? With good j a substitute for all other
goods, reducing the tariff on j increases imports of this good and decreases net imports
of all other goods (which for the numeraire good amounts to an increase in exports).
Consider first the case where capital mobility is absent and therefore the changes in net
imports at domestic prices sum to zero. With an increase in exports, this implies that
the increase in import value at domestic prices of good j exceeds the combined decrease
in import value of all the other import goods. With τj the highest tariff, this translates
into an increase in tariff revenue at constant domestic prices and hence a welfare increase.
With international capital mobility and good j not capital intensive, lowering τj leads to
a capital inflow into the country. For simplicity, set E0j = 0, i.e. lowering the tariff on
good j leaves exports unchanged. Then the sum of the increase in import value of good
j and capital inflows at domestic prices equal the decrease in import value of all other
goods, and hence the import value at domestic prices falls. Even with τj the highest tariff
it is now possible that tariff revenue – and hence welfare – decreases. With E0j > 0 this
becomes less likely, but is still a possibility.
It is easily checked also in (11) that the concertina result “from below” (introducing
a tariff on a previously freely traded good increases welfare) holds irrespective of the
capital intensity of this good: With τj = 0, the term in brackets becomes strictly negative,
which gives the stated result. Intuitively, this is because increasing τj from zero increases
imports of all other goods, thereby increasing tariff revenue at constant domestic prices
unambiguously. The results can be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 1. Let good j be a net substitute for all other goods. Then, if j is the good
with the highest ad valorem tariff, lowering this tariff may lower welfare if and only if j is
not capital intensive. If j is freely traded initially, introducing a small tariff on its imports
increases welfare irrespective of whether j is capital intensive or not.
The mechanism leading to the possible breakdown of the concertina result in the present
framework is analogous at a formal level to the one that may invalidate the concertina
result in the standard model when complementarities between goods are present. This
is most easily seen by assuming a complementarity between good j and the export good
0, and therefore ωrj = 0 and ω0j < 0. With goods j and 0 complements in net import
demand, lowering the tariff on j increases domestic demand for good 0, thereby reducing
aggregate exports and hence aggregate imports. In the case considered in the present
paper, where we stick to the standard assumption of substitutability between good j and
all other goods, exports increase as a consequence of trade liberalisation, but imports need
not.
2.2 Market Access Effects of Trade Liberalisation
Market access is measured by the volume of gross imports, evaluated at world market
prices pw. Given that we have assumed that m contains all import goods (and only
import goods), we can write market access as
M = pw ′m. (12)
We introduce the following notation: A diagonal matrix with the elements of vector x on
the main diagonal is denoted by x, ι denotes a vector of ones, and τˆ is the vector of ad
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valorem tariffs as a proportion of the world market price (i.e. τˆi = ti/pwi ). Differentiation
gives
dM = pw ′ (Eppdp+ Epudu)
=
[
pw +
pwEpu
pwEpu + Ep0u
t
]′
Eppdt
= [pw + βt]′Eppdt
= pw ′ [ι+ βτˆ ]Eppdt, (13)
where we have used Eu = pEpu + Ep0u (and hence µ
−1 = pwEpu + Ep0u) in line two, and
β ≡ (pwEpu)/(pwEpu+Ep0u) is the marginal propensity to spend on importables. We will
assume 0 < β < 1 throughout. Rewriting the market access equation for the case where
only the tariff on good j is altered gives
dM =
∑
i6=0
pwi (1 + βτˆi)Eijdtj
=
∑
i6=0
pwi
pi
(1 + βτˆi) piEijdtj
=
∑
i6=0
1 + βτˆi
1 + τˆi
piEijdtj
=
∑
i6=0
[1− τi(1− β)] piEijdtj
= −(1− β)
τj − ∑
i6=0,j
ωijτi − ω0j + ωrj1− β
 pjEjjdtj (14)
with ωij , ωrj and
∑
i6=0,j ωij defined as above.
5 Using (10) this can be rewritten as
dM = −(1− β)
(
τj − τ oj −
ω0j + ωrj
1− β
)
pjEjjdtj . (15)
5Note that we have used τˆ = τ/(1 − τ) in line four. Equation (14) is identical to equation (45) from
the NBER working paper version of Anderson and Neary (2006) but for the addition of ωrj .
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Lowering the tariff on good j increases market access if and only if the term in brackets
is negative. We can therefore define the constrained market access minimizing tariff on
good j, given the tariffs on the other goods, as
τ˜j = τ oj +
ω0j + ωrj
1− β , (16)
and lowering τj increases market access if and only if τj < τ˜j . The NDL proposition of Ju
and Krishna (2000) can be illustrated by setting ωrj = 0 in (16). In the borderline case
considered by them where exports do not react to a change in tariffs, ω0j is zero and the
constrained welfare maximizing and market access minimizing tariffs coincide. Hence, a
tariff decrease – and indeed any tariff change – either increases welfare or market access
but not both. In the general case where export goods are net substitutes for good j we
have τ˜j > τ oj , and lowering τj increases both market access and welfare if τ˜j > τj > τ
o
j .
It is easy to see that a double loss situation, where lowering τj decreases both market
access and welfare, requires τ˜j < τ oj . From (16), a necessary and sufficient condition for
this to occur is ω0j +ωrj < 0. Clearly, given ω0j > 0, this requires ωrj < 0, i.e. a situation
where good j is not capital intensive. Then, lowering τj decreases both market access and
welfare if τ˜j < τj < τ oj . We therefore have:
Proposition 2. Consider the case where good j is not capital intensive. It is then possible
for a double loss scenario to exist with a range of values for the tariff on good j where
lowering this tariff decreases both welfare and market access. No double loss can occur if
good j is capital intensive.
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3 A Link Between Welfare and Market Access
For the standard model where capital mobility is absent, Anderson and Neary (2006) have
pointed out a number of links between welfare increasing and market access increasing
tariff reforms that go beyond the NDL result of Ju and Krishna (2000). In this section,
we explore this issue for the model with international capital mobility, focusing on the
concertina reform.
Note from the previous section that ω0j + ωrj ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for the con-
certina theorem to hold, and a necessary and sufficient condition for the NDL proposition.
Hence we know immediately that whenever the concertina result does not hold there is the
possibility for a double loss scenario as well. To say something more specific than this, let
τ1 be the highest tariff and τ2 be the second-highest tariff. Using this notation, a necessary
and sufficient condition for the concertina result to break down is τ o1 > τ2. In this case,
lowering τ1 will decrease welfare if τ o1 > τ1 > τ2, i.e. for the highest tariff sufficiently
close to the level of second highest tariff. Lowering τ1 will furthermore decrease market
access if τ˜1 ≤ τ2. We find that this double loss situation necessarily follows whenever the
concertina reform does not hold:
Proposition 3. If lowering the highest tariff decreases welfare it reduces market access
as well.
Proof. The necessary and sufficient condition for the breakdown of the concertina result,
τ o1 > τ2, can be re-written, using (10), as
(ω01 + ωr1)τ2 +
∑
i6=0,1,2
ωi1(τ2 − τi) < 0. (17)
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The sufficient condition for a decrease in the highest tariff to yield a fall in market access,
τ˜1 ≤ τ2, can be re-written, using (10) and (16), as
(ω01 + ωr1)
(
1
1− β − τ2
)
≤
∑
i6=0,1,2
ωi1(τ2 − τi). (18)
Eq. (17) requires ω01 + ωr1 < 0, under which condition eq. (18) holds as well.
4 Conclusion
The concertina result from the theoretical literature on tariff reform has been influential
in real-world trade liberalisation strategies. In this paper we show that under otherwise
standard assumptions the existence of international capital mobility can render this reform
welfare decreasing. This possibility exists if the good whose tariff is lowered is not capital
intensive, and hence trade liberalisation, by shifting resources to other sectors of the
economy, triggers an inflow of internationally mobile capital. We furthermore show that if
the concertina reform lowers welfare it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising
a second goal that policy makers typically connect with trade liberalisation.
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